

The PLA and China's threat perceptions

The China Quarterly; London; Jun 1996; [Whiting, Allen S](#);

Issue: 146
Start Page: 596
ISSN: 03057410
Subject Terms: [Perceptions](#)
[National security](#)
[Modernization](#)
[Foreign policy](#)
[Armed forces](#)

Geographic Names: United States
US
China

Companies: [Peoples Liberation Army-China](#)

Abstract:

Whiting examines China's threat perceptions within the framework of key post-Tiananmen events, including the collapse of the USSR, the Persian Gulf War, and the evolution of US Asia-Pacific policies. These perceptions provide a favorable context for modernization of the People's Liberation Army.

Full Text:

Copyright Oxford University Press(England) Jun 1996

Because this volume focuses on the People's Liberation Army (PLA), only those threat perceptions directly relevant to the presence of Chinese military force are addressed in this article. The problems of ideological unity, legitimacy of the regime, and other political or economic threats to the People's Republic are excluded insofar as they do not call on the PLA. Nor are general foreign policy stratagems for dealing with Moscow, Tokyo, New Delhi and Washington under review, let alone regions beyond China's capacity to project military power.

1

Several methodological problems must be acknowledged at the outset. The use of "China" in the title does not assume a uniform net threat assessment with the PLA or the civilian leadership. A divergence of probable and possible threat perceptions held among both military and civilian analysts is not only plausible but is attested to by widespread interviews and media sources.

2

This requires tentative conclusions on what threats are anticipated, in what sequence of priority and timing, and by which sectors of the regime. In particular the accepted convenience of reference to "the military" and "the PLA" does not assume a monolithic perspective across regions, services and generations, retired and active. Nationalism may prompt identical assertions where sovereignty is threatened as with Taiwan. But specific operational responsibility will probably evoke different threat assessments from one military source to another.

Sources of information present other problems. Secrecy is endemic in military affairs but doubly so in China where transparency is at a minimum and security consciousness is maximal. Interviews with

foreigners must be conducted with the expectation of the content being relayed to foreign governments or public audiences. In addition, domestic politics, bureaucratic budget battles and patron-client alignments are universal phenomena in military systems, with varying impact on factionalism in the PLA over time.

3

This complex context for Chinese comments on future threats conditions what is said and not said to foreigners or in print. Nevertheless access to military and civilian security analysts is a definite improvement over the Mao era. Repetition of such contacts over time permits longitudinal comparison through changing domestic and international situations.

4

A second major source is Chinese publications.

5

These vary in authoritativeness, audience and sophistication, the most direct reflection of military views being Jiefangjun bao.

6

However as with interviews, official constraints combine with the changing domestic and bureaucratic politics to affect articles. The problem is further complicated by Hong Kong press "leaks." These vary in reliability with little basis for confirmation, particularly where personalities are allegedly involved in foreign policy disputes.

7

These "leaks" often reflect one side in a political struggle, but they nevertheless add another point of inference to be tested against logic where evidence is lacking. In short, despite acknowledged problems, interviews and media are necessary albeit insufficient sources.

8

This article's focus on 1993-95 updates earlier analyses. It also captures a longer Chinese perspective within the framework of key post-Tiananmen events, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War and the evolution of Washington's Asia-Pacific policies. This does not preclude change over time, given the problematic evolution of leadership in the next ten years. However the relative stability of political and economic policy priorities since 1979 encourages cautious projection from past and present patterns of threat articulation.

A final methodological problem concerns the impact of threat perceptions on behaviour. This raises the larger questions of information-processing, cost calculation and the politics of decision-making in Beijing. Chinese scholars are just beginning to address these questions on the basis of archives, memoirs and interviews for the Mao era. Systematic research on subsequent years lacks a similar evidential base for comparison, much less generalization. Given these limitations, projections of probable linkages between perceived threat and specific behaviour must remain speculative.

For the purpose of this analysis, two assumptions frame the threat forecasts inferred from these sources. First, domestic dissidence and regime factionalism will not jeopardize leadership control of the country. Otherwise the traditional Chinese premise of "trouble within, danger without" will significantly heighten threat perceptions. Attendant efforts to unite the country will also magnify external threats. Secondly, Taiwan will not declare its independence. Otherwise Beijing's declared use of force in response will trigger fresh alarm over possible intervention by Washington and Tokyo.

In General: No Present Threat

Overviews of East Asia in a major foreign policy journal from 1992 to 1995 emphasize the absence of any immediate security threat.

9

Interviews echo this view.

10

Analysts depict a classic realpolitik balance of power in the region. No dominant country threatens any state and no regime seeks to upset the balance. "Difficulties" and "problems" exist in virtually all bilateral relations but none appear sufficiently serious to disrupt the peace.

One author noted "territorial disputes and ethnic and religious conflicts which could interfere with stability" in East Asia while "some countries still harbour suspicions about Japan developing into a military power."

11

"Tensions and crises in some areas or some individual problems" were possible, but "looking at the entire entity, the Asia-Pacific region could possibly remain stable for the next decade." More specifically, "China's relations with these territorial neighbours are in a totally fine situation."

Against the geometrical configurations that epitomized Cold War analyses, another writer explicitly ruled out "tripartite alliances" in North-East Asia.

12

Rejecting the argument of "some people still ... in line with the political logic of the Cold War," he denied that China, South Korea and Russia were aligned against Japan because "looking forward into the nineties, we see that the strategic interests of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are objectively identical."

This provides a favourable context for PLA modernization, as argued in a military journal.

13

Peace does not reduce the PLA need for more money and weapons because "the new round of the arms race ... is actually more intense and threatening" than in the Cold War. But "the current golden

opportunity ... more relaxed and favourable to China's peaceful development" provides "fine conditions for PLA weapons development." Being "roughly 15-20 years behind those of advanced nations," no quick fix is possible. This implies that the "golden opportunity" will last until the next century, allowing research and development to modernize all three services.

Not everyone agrees with this sanguine prognosis. The same journal carried a comprehensive threat agenda, seemingly in reverse order of long-term versus near-term. While "the possibility of aggression against China ... is not great ... the threat around the borders will increase markedly."

14

Thus "India has pursued ... resistance in the north, advance to the west." Japan's military growth "exceeds its national defence needs." Vietnam has "territorial disputes and contention over marine rights and interests" with China while "certain members of ASEAN attempt to encroach on China's Spratly Islands." Meanwhile Taiwan's "military strength is increasing, independence is gaining ground and outside powers are providing support." In sum, "all these things create a threat to the integrity of Chinese territory that cannot be ignored."

China's Sovereignty Requires Protection

This negative forecast highlights military sources warning of threats to territorial sovereignty. According to "Chinese military academic circles," American and Japanese definitions of military threat do not include "sovereignty" as an explicit concern.

15

However the broader Chinese approach "refers to the negative effects, danger and harm done to national interests, including a nation's sovereignty, survival, security and development by another nation." Two factors determine military threat. "First ... fundamental contradictions or interest conflicts, such as opposing social systems and ideologies as well as disputes in economic interests, territorial and ocean rights and interests which are the prerequisites for the rise of a threat Second ... one side must be backed by powerful military strength, which is the condition for posing a threat."

This all-embracing definition of military threat provides a rationale for expanding PLA responsibilities well beyond defence against attack. Concern for lebensraum or living space appeared in a military book, *A New Scramble for Soft Frontiers*.

16

After reprising the "three million square kilometres" of "territories lost" in past centuries, it claimed that because of economic growth "our area for survival is shrinking.... Actually

we have to

reclaim sovereignty and sovereign interests in the oceans--territorial seas, continental shelf and exclusive economic zones a total area of three million square kilometres."

A naval officer spelled out more precisely the PLA "blue water" mission.

17

In "a new era, state security is more importantly expressed as **economic security** and environmental security." Therefore the "**navy** with its unique characteristic of 'using non-combat forms' must patrol the blue water in a new guise as economic and diplomatic emissary." More bluntly, "the international law of the sea today stipulates thus: the black land is yours, the blue water is everyone's, and the brown water is yours and everyone's The enlightenment from historical experience today is: if you cannot occupy yours, it is someone else's."

The linkage between economic and environmental security on the one hand and Chinese naval power projection on the other marks commentary on ocean resources. Wang Yan, head of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, claims "the largest single gas field discovered in our country so far" is in the South China Sea.

18

On the centenary of the 1894 Sino-Japanese war, another PLA officer declared, "when it comes to 'ocean territory,' for China we can say, every inch is gold]"

19

But with "only slightly more than half of this type of 'every inch is gold' ocean territory now in our hands ... when we mention 1894, the resulting suffering and anguish is as if one had touched an unhealed wound on the body of our national history." Thus the broader "century of shame and humiliation" remains the emotive referent for an assertive nationalism underlying PLA pronouncements on perceived threats to territorial integrity.

20

More directly, one military journal called for "strengthening border defence regions, especially hot spots where there are territorial or island ownership disputes."

21

This same author explained China's past weakness as prompting "Western colonialists" to create "border disputes and contradictions over such things as ownership of islands and maritime boundaries sufficient to cause local border and maritime wars and military conflicts."

Spratly Islands: The Immediate Threat

For more than two decades, China's claims to the Spratly Islands have conflicted with those of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and, technically, the Republic of China on Taiwan.

22

Prior to 1995 two brief Chinese victories over Vietnam, in the Paracel Islands and the Spratlys, had been the only notable instances of confrontation.

23

However in early 1995 a series of incidents between Beijing and Manila brought the Spratlys to international attention.

24

PRC occupation of a reef claimed by the Philippines prompted Manila to mobilize international support by a press junket to the disputed area. Chinese sources reportedly termed this "provocative" and noted military reaction could occur next time.

25

Then the Philippine navy blew up Chinese markers on reefs claimed by Manila, triggering ominous warnings of "unpredictable" consequences since Beijing had been "restraining" its military thus far.

Chinese maps depict virtually the entire South China Sea within PRC borders, although specific boundary lines apparently remain to be determined.

26

Analysts see all foreign presence other than shipping as an invasion of Chinese territory. Citing the UN Convention on Law of the Sea authorizing 200 miles of exclusive economic zone, one writer claimed,

An area of more than 800,000 square kilometres within China's traditional maritime boundaries has been illegally delineated into the domain of other nations, with 410,000 square kilometres taken by the Philippines, 270,000 by Malaysia, 70,000 by Vietnam, 50,000 by Indonesia, and the remainder by Brunei.

These countries, which border the Spratly Islands, have drilled 120 oil wells within China's boundaries.

27

He calculated that Malaysia would extract 35 million tons of crude oil annually by 2000 with Indonesia already producing 20 million tons.

In 1995 Jakarta put a formal question to Beijing concerning the basis for a PRC map that purportedly showed China's exclusive economic zone as overlapping the Natuna Islands with potentially the largest natural gas reserve in East Asia.

28

After several months of delay, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen informed Foreign Minister Ali Alatas that the Natuna Islands belonged to Indonesia and had never been claimed by Beijing. Qian also acknowledged existence of an archipelagic state as defined by the 1982 convention which China supported. In August Qian informed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that China would accept the convention as a basis for resolution of the Spratly Islands dispute where China had "indisputable sovereignty."

29

A ten-year Chinese geological survey reported "vast submarine basins containing oil and natural gas" throughout the islands.

30

In addition to this projected "second Persian Gulf" there "is also a great deposit of phosphate, copper, iron, aluminum, and other metal and mineral resources ... the Nansha

Spratly

Islands are a real treasure house."

31

Chinese media also emphasize the "important passage linking the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean that

serves as China's largest tropical fishing ground."

32

These economic factors become infused with an assertive nationalism when alleged evidence of ownership dating back to the Qin and Han dynasties is juxtaposed against claim of recent victimization by China's neighbours.

33

Although Hong Kong media report strong naval pressure for more aggressive action in the Spratlys, formidable logistical problems are admitted by Chinese military analysts.

34

Graphic accounts tell how all the water and soil must be transported to make habitable coral reefs swept by typhoons.

35

Tens of millions of yuan and years of effort reportedly went into a Spratlys naval base "aimed at meeting the requirements of future sea battles."

36

Fear that time is working against China's interests turns on Vietnam, its relations with ASEAN and ASEAN's own attention to the controversy. Meanwhile ASEAN countries are seen as increasing defence expenditures mainly to purchase modern weapons with emphasis on air and naval forces, with

joint military exercises on a sub-ASEAN level.

37

In 1974 China seized the Paracel Islands from South Vietnamese forces and in 1988 took several Spratly islands in two-day clash. In the 1990s both Hanoi and Beijing granted foreign oil companies exploration rights in overlapping claimed areas in the Gulf of Tonkin. Minor military confrontations by air and sea ended peacefully but reasserted mutual determination to stand by territorial claims.

38

In 1992 ASEAN concluded the Manila Declaration calling for no further military build-up on the Spratlys and a peaceful resolution of all disputes. Beijing proposed joint exploration to be negotiated bilaterally with rival claimants but insisted its sovereignty was not at issue. The 1995 Beijing-Manila confrontation prompted ASEAN to try addressing the dispute in a vice-ministerial meeting with Chinese representatives who refused multilateral discussions.

39

But with Vietnam joining ASEAN in July, Beijing agreed at the ARF meeting to multilateral discussion as a tactical concession.

Military criticism of Foreign Ministry policy had reportedly arisen earlier as addressed below.

40

The conflict of national and bureaucratic interests between winning foreign economic investment and advancing territorial control was not easily resolved, particularly in the waning days of Deng Xiaoping.

41

PLA reorganization and weapons procurement put protecting South China Sea claims as a matter of national priority.

42

Temporary resolution of the bureaucratic conflict in both the Gulf of Tonkin and the Spratly Islands was suggested by Chinese tactics resembling wei qi (go in Japanese).

43

In this game the goal is gradually to envelop an opponent's pieces without taking them directly as in chess. Through the process of occupying empty spaces no direct confrontation is intended at that moment. In the Spratly Islands this avoids escalation while China's position is nevertheless strengthened. Similar tactics characterized PLA moves in 1962 against Indian patrols in the disputed Himalayan heights. However this ended in a major clash when neither side agreed to concede its claims.

44

The stakes in the South China Sea as seen from Beijing surpass those at issue with India and therefore appear even more unlikely to be compromised on the Chinese side. Concession to any multilateral settlement that would limit Chinese sovereignty has far-reaching ramifications for claims over the East China and Yellow seas where geological projections posit extensive oil and natural gas reserves.

45

Japanese control of the Senkaku islands (Diaoyutai in Chinese) at the eastern edge of the continental shelf is disputed by both Beijing and Taipei. However in concluding the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, China and Japan agreed to defer discussion indefinitely. Beijing's earlier protest to Seoul and Tokyo over their proposed joint exploration of waters adjoining the Yellow Sea likewise remains quiescent. Nevertheless, despite the absence of military tension, these disputes have kept major foreign oil firms from exploring potential oil and gas resources in both areas.

Energy shortages remain a serious bottleneck throughout China's economic modernization. Coal is in abundance but highly pollutant. Nuclear facilities will take years as with hydroelectric power from harnessing the Yangzi. Thus fossil fuels are necessary to meet the demands of growth estimated at 5 to 6 per cent in coming decades. But the largest land reserves are in Xinjiang, far from consumption points. Importing oil requires hard-earned foreign exchange. Under the circumstances, national security places a premium on offshore resources under Chinese control. In this context the Spratly Islands are small pieces in a much larger puzzle to be salvaged by a combination of diplomatic and military means. Therefore leadership views and PLA capability will be critical to future policy.

Taiwan: The Near-term Threat

In contrast with the Spratly Islands, no confrontation of any significance has occurred in the Taiwan Straits since 1962 when sudden PLA deployments responded to a perceived threat of invasion by Chinese Nationalist forces backed by Washington.

46

In the late 1980s virtual termination of the civil war facilitated growing economic interdependence manifested in trade, tourism and Taiwanese investment on the mainland. In the 1990s negotiation of "non-political" matters between "non-official" representatives of Beijing and Taipei seemed to augur an incremental approach to discussion of reunification, if not actual resolution of the problem.

Nevertheless concern arose in Beijing over trends in the island's prospects as a separate entity. Taipei exercised "flexible diplomacy" to seek re-entry to the United Nations and an opposition party was permitted to advocate Taiwanese independence. The announced sale of 150 F-16 planes to Taiwan by President Bush in 1992 and the slight but symbolic elevation of relations between Washington and Taipei by President Clinton in 1994 also contributed to this concern. In June 1995 Washington permitted Lee Teng-hui, president of the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC), to attend an alumni meeting at Cornell University.

Beijing had adamantly opposed admitting Lee to the United States even on a private basis with no official contacts, claiming it was in violation of three Sino-American communiques. Washington had earlier agreed to deny him a visa but reversed this after near unanimous resolutions were passed by Congress. Lee added fuel to the fire with politically charged statements on his return to Taiwan hailing

the visit as a breakthrough for the ROC and Taiwan.

The PRC reaction, albeit somewhat delayed, included recall of the Chinese ambassador for consultation that continued through the summer, cancellation of important military visits, and the most intensive political attacks since 1989-90.

47

Reviving accusations from the 1950s, Beijing Review: claimed, "Washington attempts to make Taiwan Island, believed to be an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier,' serve its power politics and hegemonist strategy."

48

Another article claimed Lee's visit had "shaken the principled foundation for the maintenance of Sino-U.S. relations over the last 16 years."

49

Military activity underscored Beijing's more assertive posture. As announced in advance, in July six surface-to-surface unarmed missile launches of varying range targeted the East China Sea 80 miles above Taiwan.

50

Exercises in Xiamen reportedly included joint force landings while Beijing acknowledged war games off Zhejiang province.

51

Meanwhile the Hong Kong press reported rising PLA demand, encouraged by Jiang Zemin, for a strong response to perceived Washington-Taipei collusion threatening to separate the island permanently.

52

These developments made plausible earlier reports of a December 1994 PLA strategy conference on Taiwan.

53

Top participants included Zhang Zhen, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC); Chi Haotian, Chief of General Staff and CMC member; Zhang Wannian, CMC member; plus notable retired generals such as Hong Xuezhi and Zhang Aiping. The first three won their positions at the 14th Party Congress in October 1992. Chi, on behalf of the CMC, allegedly declared: "Right now, Taiwan independence is the arch-enemy of the Chinese nation. The plan to pursue policies of Taiwan independence, 'one China, one Taiwan,' and 'two Chinas' is equivalent to an open declaration of war." He warned that Taipei was counting on a power struggle and internal turmoil in the post-Deng era, concluding, "as long as the Lee Teng-hui authorities refuse to change ... we will use military means to resolve this issue." A summary of the conference views included: better resolve the Taiwan issue earlier

than later; the most appropriate time is between the end of this century and 2005; Taiwan intends to utilize the United States, Western Europe and Japan in moving towards independence; when independence is imminent, it will be time for military action; at that point a limited maritime and aerial blockade should isolate the island; and when drastic political change occurs on Taiwan or continuous chaos prevails, a certain price must be paid but military action must be taken.

It is conceivable that this report was deliberately planted abroad to influence policy and politics on Taiwan. Alternatively it could have tested civilian views by military assertiveness in anticipation of Deng Xiaoping's demise. However it is consistent with the tenor of rumoured PLA complaints over "passive" policy toward the United States in general and Taiwan in particular during 1993-94. This suggests it represents the dominant military threat perception of Taiwan's independence, aided and abetted by the United States and Japan.

54

Even more than with the Spratly Islands, logistical problems confront any short-term effort at a maritime and aerial blockade of Taiwan, complicated further by serious political and economic costs imposed by international reaction.

55

This may explain why, despite the urgent tone, the reported conference remarks fail to specify precisely when military action will be "appropriate." On the other hand, an optimistic PLA scenario might calculate that simply announcing a blockade would panic Taiwan authorities to seek reunification while the United States chose to stand aside. Miscalculation on either point could result in short-term embarrassment, as in the abortive 1958 Quemoy bombardment and with "punishing" Vietnam in 1979. Worse would be long-term costs as in Korea after 1950. At a minimum, backing down and disengagement could be politically difficult, if not disastrous, for a post-Deng leadership.

Whereas the Spratly Islands resources promise significant economic gains to be won, Taiwan's acquisition is almost wholly politically motivated by a long-professed commitment to national integrity and reunification. An added nationalistic impetus lies in the fact that had Washington not interposed the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits in 1950, the Nationalist redoubt would have eventually fallen to a PLA invasion. Thus nativistic emotional drives may override pragmatic calculations of the military power balance in PLA considerations of when and how to use force against Taiwan.

Unlike the Spratly Islands, however, the growing political and economic engagement with Taiwan builds up a vested interest in the status quo with hope that the mutual gain in peaceful unification will outweigh the risks of separation and confrontation. Postponement of attack since 1950 has not yet resulted in Taiwan independence pressures passing the point of no return. So long as peaceful reunification can be hoped for, any PLA pressures that arise are likely to be confined to militant words without military action beyond exercises as in 1995-96.

The United States: Threat for the PLA?

In terms of rhetoric, quantitative and qualitative, the United States clearly ranks as number one threat to the security of the People's Republic. American policies and actions toward Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and human rights are all seen as aimed at the eventual demise of Communism in China. This image, reportedly rife among various PLA circles, is tempered in statements responding to visits by high

American dignitaries, especially military personnel.

56

But in 1994-95 Chinese sources told of a debate between those who saw Washington as acting on successive but separate issues that cumulatively were "anti-China" and those who claimed American policy was a consistent and comprehensive long-term strategy to deny China wealth and power. By mid-1995 the debate favoured the harder line analysis.

57

That autumn the more moderate interpretation appeared in mainland media.

58

As the main target of public attack, however, Taiwan independence as an "archenemy" was explained primarily by indigenous Taiwanese factors, first and foremost Lee Teng-hui, secondarily backed by Washington and Tokyo.

59

This does not minimize American involvement, explicitly noted in the sale of F-16s and other military technology. However it removes the United States from the immediate threat at hand in Taiwan.

It is logical for PLA planning to posit a potential conflict with the United States as the major power in East Asia. War games played against the American "enemy" have been standard since 1991.

60

The Soviet Union, now Russia, is no longer a primary threat and Japan will not become one in this century. In addition, during the Gulf War American technological prowess awed and inspired the PLA to model its modernization on that of the Pentagon.

61

Yet none of this means that an American attack is seen as likely in the coming decade.

At a symposium involving 23 departments and organizations concerned with strategic analysis from 25 November to 5 December 1993, attended by high level active and retired civilian and military leaders, the final report defined how "U.S. hegemonism" will target China to the year 2000:

Its strategy towards China is to, through economic activities and trade, control and sanction China and force China to change the course of its ideology and make it incline towards the West; take advantage of opening up, personnel exchanges, and propaganda means to make ideological infiltration into China's upper strata; give financial assistance to hostile forces both inside and outside Chinese territories and wait for the opportune moment to stir up turbulence.

62

Notably absent is any direct military threat involving the PLA, despite the joint sponsorship of the symposium by the General Office of the CMC and the General Office of the CPC Central Committee. Only in the case of "turbulence" would it be called on, should the 400,000-strong People's Armed Police fail to suffice.

The term diren or enemy as applied to the United States by "defence planners and international security specialists in Beijing" properly categorizes the general perception of American goals in China as inimical to survival of the present regime.

63

It is in this sense that the symposium saw Washington as the present archenemy, although only one fourth saw this status continuing after 2020, by which time Tokyo would have taken its place.

Perception of Americans' intentions is influenced by how their statements are interpreted or translated.

64

In August 1994 a widely misreported Pentagon study of post-Deng prospects claimed that specialists saw a 50-50 chance the regime would fall apart. In Beijing this could be seen as a goal, not a forecast. Consultations in Beijing in August 1994 revealed a widespread belief that Washington opposes greater wealth and power for China.

65

Support for Taiwan and Tibet, blocking Beijing for the year 2000 Olympics, backing Chinese dissidents, "interference" in South China Sea issues by depicting a "China threat" and advocacy of security forums all purportedly proved American hostility. According to "Chinese officials and U.S. experts resident in China," this view is "widely prevalent...at senior levels and supporting intellectuals and experts ... Chinese observers who disagreed ... were unable or unwilling to challenge the premises and factual basis."

Chinese access to Congressional Research Service reports could reinforce this belief if read with prejudice. One study itemized "factors favoring viewing China as a current or emerging threat," with five pages on "capabilities" and three on "intentions," compared with a total of five for both categories "arguing against" a China threat.

66

The "positive and negative incentives" listed among "U.S. policy options" can "enhance regional stability and curb China's potential expansion." A following report claims "general agreement in the United States that Washington should use its influence ... over time to foster changes in China's political, economic, and security systems compatible with American interests."

67

These authoritative analyses support the hard-line critique of American policy as aiming at "containment of China," if not its actual dismemberment.

This perceived threat strikes at the basic sense of national identity. Patriotism is the bedrock of military discipline. The PLA cannot but concern itself with American goals seen as challenging its central purpose. It will therefore pressure policy accordingly, but beyond this have no immediate responsibility for countering the political, as opposed to the military, threat of the United States.

Japan: Beyond 2000

Senior security analysts see Japan as China's most serious long-range military threat. This concern has remained unabated over time despite Japan providing major amounts of foreign aid, loans, investment, technology and trade. Younger Japan specialists do not share this view but have no visible impact on their elders, as shown by interviews over the past decade.

68

During this period war games have consistently targeted Japan's air and naval threat.

69

In 1995 the yearly forecast of international relations in a major journal warned: "While Sino-Japanese friendly and co-operative relations remain the mainstream, troubles are still growing. With certain high Japanese officials repeatedly singing the same old tune of denial of Japan's war of aggression, while publicly elevating relations with Taiwan, one should be concerned about whether Japan is taking the route of amending its peace constitution."

70

The 50th anniversary of Japan's surrender evoked fresh expressions of concern over future Japanese militarism. One commentary on the Diet's ambiguous "non-apology" resolution on Tokyo's record of aggression noted:

First, the number objecting to adoption of the resolution was unexpectedly large They can no longer be described as "a minority" or "few people." We should be soberly aware that this is hardly a negligible force

The atmosphere spreading over the Japanese islands is very ominous and unhealthy, so that some people in Japan too are worried that neo-facism may emerge in the country We must never be muddleheaded.

71

Multiple rationales support this perception, the most basic being the classic admonition, "past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide to the future."

72

Repeated Japanese aggression from 1894 to 1945 provides a leitmotif of public and private statements reflecting the bitter heritage of national humiliation and personal suffering. Vivid media presentations commemorating the 1937 Nanjing massacre and the 1945 victory over Japan renew anger over the past

and raise alarm over the future.

73

An analysis of Sino-Japanese relations cited "potentially deep conflicts" underlying "a generally good stage of growth."

74

Despite the Senkaku Islands dispute being shelved, "the Japanese Maritime Defence Department has certainly never stopped its maritime patrols of these islands, attempting to use de facto control as legal grounds for sovereignty. Japan is now treating China as a potential enemy." Unnamed "political forces that support 'Taiwanese independence'" added cause for concern.

This concern is argued in varying realpolitik scenarios. Japan must acquire military power to protect its economic power, or alternatively Japan's economic power will prompt it to become a military power. Japan will lose faith in the American security treaty and expand its defence capability, or alternatively Japan will break with the United States over trade issues and strike out alone as a military power. By whatever reasoning, Japan's future military threat is seen to be certain.

Comparing Japanese and Chinese naval capabilities lends credence to some concern.

75

Japanese destroyers and frigates are superior in quantity and quality. Tokyo's submarine fleet is growing steadily. Air and sea coverage 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo presents an extensive defence screen. Technological material and human resources provide an ominous edge of advantage in a prolonged arms race. Sino-Japanese disputes over ownership of the East China Sea continental shelf and the associated Senkaku Islands with potentially large oil and natural gas reserves make such a race well worth winning.

Japanese expressions of concern over Chinese power projection in the South China Sea threatening Japan's interests reinforce suspicion in Beijing that Tokyo will insinuate itself into the Spratly Islands controversy.

76

One Chinese writer stressed Japan's reliance on shipping lanes there for 80 per cent of its oil imports and called attention to Japan surpassing American investments in surrounding countries, concluding, "certain Japanese would, when the time is ripe, widen the scope of naval escorts to 1,000 nautical miles to include the South China Sea ... Japan could intervene in the dispute and make matters in the southern seas even more complicated."

77

In May 1995 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama while visiting Beijing expressed hope for a "peaceful settlement" of the dispute; in response China reasserted historic ownership over the islands.

78

The Research Institute of Naval Vessels, associated with the Chinese navy, reprised changes in the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) mission from coastal defence in the 1960s to blue water defence in the 1980s as explained by "militaristic desire."

79

SDF peace-keeping forces abroad and participation with the United States and others in Rimpac exercises showed a "new militaristic path." Other articles ritualistically note annual increases in SDF budgets that rank "third in the world."

In the December 1993 future security symposium 60 per cent of the participants reportedly saw Japan as the top threat by 2020.

80

Its military expenditure will be first in the world, 25 times higher than China. Papers focused on Japan's ability to produce nuclear weapons, ambitions towards Taiwan, the revival of Japanese militarism, strategy towards China, and "factors leading to anti-China wars by Japan." In contrast with a present political American threat, that foreseen from Japan places prime responsibility on the PLA for defending the entire span of maritime territory claimed by China. Given assumptions based on historical experience and vital ocean resources at stake, Chinese threat assessments of Japan are crucial to the long-term stability of East Asia.

The Land Borders Threat: Lowest Priority

In the 1993 security symposium only 10 per cent foresaw Russia as China's greatest threat by 2020, arguing that territorial disputes and minority nationalities straddling the border would cause conflict. Veteran generals, on the other hand, reportedly saw Russia as an eventual weight to balance against the American and Japanese threats. Reciprocally analysts see China as necessary for Russia to balance against the United States and Europe as well as Japan.

81

Sino-Russian summit meetings in 1992, 1994 and 1995 marked the progressive resolution of border differences, sharply increased trade and significant transfers of Russian weapons and military technology to China.

82

Agreement on withdrawal of forces by 100 km on both sides, due by 2000, followed large unilateral reductions in regional deployments.

83

On the 50th anniversary of victory in the Second World War, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin pledged "a new type of long-term, steady relationship of good neighbourliness, friendship, and mutually beneficial co-operation."

84

Renmin ribao hailed "a constructive Sino-Russian partnership."

85

Some see troublesome possibilities nevertheless, such as a hypernationalistic ethos epitomized by the "Zhirinovsky threat."

86

One Jiefangjun bao writer claimed a "recently formulated military school of thought" had shifted Moscow from a "purely defensive strategy to one that equally emphasizes defence and offence, signifying that Russia will not give up its status as a military power."

87

But these are dissenting murmurs in a chorus of praise for prospective Sino-Russian relations.

Beijing threat perceptions in Xinjiang are twofold: pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic subversion.

88

These perceptions are based on historic revolts against Chinese rule as recently as 1946.

89

The double threat re-emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union spawning independent republics along the Xinjiang border. Riots and demonstrations of varying cause are uniformly denounced in the local press as "splittism" or "counter-revolutionary," allegedly stimulated by "foreign sources."

90

The actual origin, size and nature of these outbreaks are uncertain but perceptions in Urumqi and Beijing attribute worst-case implications for security.

Russia is no longer the threat behind local dissidence as in the 1930s and 1940s.

91

Instead the presence of independent Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan across the border is seen in Beijing as a mixed blessing. Flourishing cross-border trade opens up possibilities for Xinjiang's economy otherwise largely isolated from the booming coastal provinces. On the other hand trade and travel opens a political window to self-rule as against Chinese domination. Ethno-religious ties cannot be closely controlled as they were during the Soviet period.

The actual security threat is peripheral in every sense of the word. No true unity exists among the seven million Uighurs, one million Kazakhs and another 300,000 non-Han living among some six million

Chinese with a strong PLA concentration.

92

Yet "national separatism still remains the principal threat to Xinjiang's stability," according to a 1993 official report. Logistical support for the PLA depends mainly on a single railway vulnerable to sudden sandstorms and floods. Xinjiang, spanning 1.6 million square kilometres, strategically borders eight countries. Economic importance lies in the Tarim Basin with one-seventh of China's total oil reserves and one-fourth of total gas reserves.

93

In this perspective security threats in Xinjiang can take on greater significance than that justified by reality.

Tibet poses a different security threat because of the international as well as indigenous prestige of the Dalai Lama, seen in Beijing as backed by Washington in a drive for Tibetan independence. The still disputed border with India over which the two countries fought in 1962 adds a strategic dimension to the problem. As in Xinjiang, official reports claim "the situation in Tibet is basically stable, but the anti-splittism struggle there remains intense."

94

A vital strategic road linking the two regions traverses territory claimed by India. While detente characterized Sino-Indian relations after 1988, Chinese apprehensions over New Delhi's role in Tibetan resistance continued.

95

On occasion borderland problems of "ethnic separatism" are linked with Taiwan. "Ultra-nationalism has made extensive inroads among separatists in China ... with separatist activities picking up notably in Taiwan and a number of minority regions The activities of Taiwan separatists have given separatists among minority nationalities an opening."

96

Border defence units are "mainly carrying out anti-external invasion functions

but

also carry out anti-splittist functions internally... not only a steel great wall defending national territorial sovereignty and integrity, but also are an indispensable strong force maintaining the unity of the nationalities and national unity."

97

Border problems with Burma include the spillover from conflict between the Burmese army and local dissidence by non-Burman minorities, together with drug warlords trying to control smuggling routes in conjunction with local dissidents.

98

In 1992 more than 20,000 people "surged into Chinese territory," with more than 1,000 armed minority personnel. As in Xinjiang, local ethnic cross-border ties complicate security. Close relations with Rangoon ease but do not eliminate the problem.

In Conclusion: Some Risk, Small War

China has never been more secure against outside threat since the Opium War. This assessment is shared by most civilian and military analysts. But concern over "small wars" has replaced "big war."

Jiefangjun bao article warned, "to assume as long as we are prepared for the big wars, we can win small wars is naive thinking."

99

It cautioned: "We may have specialized fighting under complex geographic circumstances and adverse weather; raids and counter-raids conducted on land, air and sea with speed and flexibility; contesting over islands and reefs to protect sea rights and interests, etc."

PLA "worst case" contingency planning is mandatory as for any defence agency. But its importance arises when planning intersects with policy based on perceptions of threat to territorial integrity, strategic interests or ultimately national survival. Such perceptions exist to varying degrees on China's maritime periphery and its more remote inland borders, except for Russia. Some are immediate, as in the Spratly Islands; some are short-term, as with Taiwan; some are long-term, as with Japan. But all introduce a level of concern into PLA assessments.

These assessments in turn can drive budget demands and weapons acquisition.

100

To the extent that this results in a steady increase in PLA power projection, neighbouring regimes are likely to respond in kind. The action-reaction spiral tends to create a self-fulfilling prophecy, reinforcing Chinese security threat perceptions. So long as Beijing avoids genuine multilateral forums for frank security exchanges, it risks making the "China threat" worse despite its protestations to the contrary.

Deng Xiaoping placed economic modernization as top priority and this required peace with all neighbouring countries. Border disputes might be settled as with Russia, discussed as with India, or postponed as with Japan. If at all possible, however, they should not be fought over. But a weaker leadership in a post-Deng regime might feel pressed, domestically or internationally, to assert itself militarily. In 1958 Mao Zedong utilized a self-initiated crisis in the Taiwan Straits to mobilize the population for a Great Leap Forward. A similar mobilization for national unity at a time of future dissidence might target Taiwan or the South China Sea for a political-military campaign. Unanticipated consequences could complicate its resolution. Miscalculation is a standard risk in foreign policy but its likelihood increases when domestic politics take priority. Alternatively, domestic crisis might trigger the "trouble within, danger without" syndrome, exaggerating threat as with Sino-Indian relations in 1962.

101

The impact of assertive nationalism on Chinese responses to perceived threat cannot be determined in advance but neither should it be underestimated. From Beijing's perspective, it has legitimate but frustrated territorial claims at various points on its periphery, most notably seaward. Denial of those claims is seen as led by a non-regional power, the United States, and potentially by a past regional aggressor, Japan. China is acquiring the political, economic and military power to reassert its self-defined traditional Middle Kingdom role in Asia. Under these circumstances perceived threats to territorial integrity and sovereignty strike at the foundations of national identity. After "a century of shame and humiliation" the sense of self held by the regime can be emotionally challenged by such threats. Emotional responses can result.

It may seem to outside observers that China's only fear is fear itself. However key sectors, civilian and military, in Beijing do not see the world that way. To the extent that various actors in East Asia appreciate this view, they may be able to interact with China so as to reduce its threat perception, thereby avoiding arms races and reducing the likelihood of miscalculated conflict.

* I am grateful to Gerald Segal and other members of the conference for comments on an earlier draft.

1

. For a recent approach to the broader subjects see Weixing Hu, "China's security agenda after the Cold War," *Pacific Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1995), pp. 117-136.

2

. For generational differences on security co-operation and differences on transparency between civilian/military researchers and PLA officers, see Robert S. McNamara et al., *Sino-American Military Relations: Mutual Responsibilities in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: National Committee on U.S. China Relations, November 1994), pp. 1-16. I am grateful for the sharing of interviews by Banning Garrett, Bonnie S. Glaser, Paul H. B. Godwin and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr.

3

. On PLA factionalism, see Michael D. Swaine, *The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions and Belief* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), p. 270; reviewed critically by You Ji, *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 32 (July 1994), pp. 175-78. For the impact of these factors on the Chinese Air Force see Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel and Jonathan D. Pollack, *China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995).

4

. See in particular articles by Banning Garrett, Bonnie S. Glaser and David Shambaugh cited below.

5

. Ross. H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese military: where it expects war--where it doesn't," *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 355-372, comments on and translates highlights from *Can China's Armed Forces Win The Next War?* Pseudonymously authored and promptly withdrawn from public availability after it appeared in Beijing, its origins are obscure. For a discussion of new sources

available for study of the PLA and China's national security, see David Shambaugh, "Appendix: a bibliographical essay on new sources for the study of China's foreign relations and nation security," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 603-618; and Robert S. Ross and Paul H. B. Godwin, "New directions in Chinese security studies." in David Shambaugh (ed.), *American Studies of Contemporary China* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 138-162.

6

. This study examined Jiefangjun bao from January 1993 to March 1995. I am grateful to Professor Yong Deng, Jiang Leying and Professor Bruce Elleman for their assistance.

7

. In one instance interviews confirmed a Zhengming (Contending) report on a unique 1993 security conference; see David Shambaugh "The insecurity of security: the PLA's evolving doctrine and threat perceptions towards 2000," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-25. Private assessments of different Hong Kong publications by veteran local reporters show little agreement on their degree of reliability.

8

. The author interviewed military and civilian security analysts in Beijing, 5-12 July 1995.

9

. Yan Xiangjun. "Cursory analysis of Asia-Pacific situation during the 1990s," *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations), No. 38 (31 December 1992), in Joint Publication Report Service (JPRS)-CAR 93-021, 5 April 1993, pp. 1-5; Yan Xiangjun and Huang Tingwei, "The security situation in the Asia-Pacific region and the relevant parties' ideas on a security mechanism," *ibid.* No. 43 (20 May 1993), in JPRS-CAR 93-060, 17 August 1993, pp. 1-5; Zheng Yin, "One-power domination of Asian-Pacific region unlikely," *ibid.* No. 10 (20 October 1994), in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (FBIS-CHI), 1 February 1995, pp. 1-7; Xu Zhixian, "Northeast Asia develops dialogue and cooperation," *ibid.* 20 January 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 5 April 1995, pp. 2-3.

10

. Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific region and its impact on Chinese interests: views from Beijing," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (June 1994), pp. 14-33; McNamara et al., *Sino-American Military Relations*, p. 11, interviews with top PLA officers, May 1994.

11

. Zhan Shiliang, "The Asia-Pacific situation and China's 'good neighbor' policy." *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (International Studies), No. 50 (13 October 1993), in JPRS-CAR 94-011, 16 February 1994, pp. 1-2.

12

. Lu Zhongwei, "Diplomatic orbits and alignments of Northeast Asia countries." Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 41 (20 March 1993), in JPRS-CAR 93-044, 29 June 1993, pp. 1-3.

13

. Ma Fajing, Dan Yuntian and Song Jie, "A discussion of PLA weapons development problems," Xiandai bingqi (Modern Weaponry), No. 6 (8 June 1993), in JPRS-CAR 93-075, 12 October 1993, pp. 34-37.

14

. Qi Fa, "Build a distinctly Chinese conventional deterrent," Xiandai bingqi, No. 3 (8 March 1993), in JPRS-CAR 93-036, 3 June 1993.

15

. Niu Tianjin and Zhang Shijiang, "Rambling talk on military threat," Jiefangjun bao, 21 September 1990, in FBIS-CHI, 11 October 1990, pp. 6.

16

. Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1995, p. 28. The author was Lieutenant-Colonel Cui Yu Chen at the Research Office of the Chengdu Military Region. For an April 1987 Jiefangjun bao article on necessary "living space" see Shambaugh, "The insecurity of security."

17

. Lieutenant-Commander Yang Zhiquan, "Officer's forum--brown water, blue water--thoughts on naval theory," Jianchuan zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships), No. 2 (8 February 1994), in JPRS-CAR 94-031, 13 May 1994, pp. 32-34.

18

. Renmin ribao, 20 February 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 10 March 1994, pp. 69-70.

19

. "The blue water is close to us: the law of the sea and the navy's function, record of an interview and discussion." Renmin ribao, 5 January 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 6 April 1995, pp. 14-17.

20

. For fuller treatment of this theme see Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese nationalism and foreign policy after Deng." The China Quarterly, No. 142 (June 1995), pp. 295-316.

21

. Mao Zhenfa and Lin Zhipei, "The strategic status of modern border defence," Guofang (National

Defence), No. 7 (15 July 1995), in FBIS-CHI, 3 October 1995, pp. 25-28.

22

. For comprehensive background see Choon-ho Park, *East Asia and the Law of the Sea* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983); Eric Hyer, "Dangerous shoals: an introduction to the South China Sea dispute," *American Asian Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 1001-16.

23

. John W. Garver, "China's push through the South China Sea: the interaction of bureaucratic and national interests." *The China Quarterly*, No. 132 (December 1992), pp. 999-1028.

24

. Nayan Chanda, "Territorial imperative," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 February 1995, pp. 14-16.

25

. Manila Standard, 23 June 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 27 June 1995, pp. 59-60.

26

. In 198, I was informed by a specialist in the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "we do not claim all the water in the South China Sea, only all the islands, reefs and shoals."

27

. Lin Mu, "The aviation dream of the Chinese people." *Shidian*, No. 7 (8 July 1994), in FBIS-CHI, 24 August 1994, pp. 35-38. In 1995 one article claimed "drilling for oil and gas on more than 220 points in the South China Sea, most of which are distributed in the waters of the Nanshas

Spratlys

." Zheng Hongfan and Yin Pinduan, "I love you, Nansha." *Renmin ribao*, 3 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 24 July 1995, pp. 37-38.

28

. Anrara in Indonesian, 21 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 24 July 1995, p. 75.

29

. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 August 1995, p. 16.

30

. Xinhua Domestic Service, 14 February 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 28 February 1994, p. 43.

31

. Zheng Hongfan and Yin Pinduan, "I love you, Nansha."

32

. An Jinglin and Xiong Zengyan, "The pillboxes are linked with the motherland," Beijing Central People's Radio Network, 6 June 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 21 June 1994, pp. 9-10.

33

. Yan Hongmo, Director of the State Oceanography Bureau, in an interview with the Hong Kong Standard, 20 April 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 20 April 1995, pp. 3-4, charged that "The Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam invaded ... in the early 1970s when China was too busy to tackle the invasion."

34

. For reported naval views see Eastern Express, 20 April 1995 coverage of Wide Angle, 20 April 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 20 April 1995, pp. 99-100. Argument by naval officers that an aircraft carrier is necessary to take the Spratlys appeared in Lin Mu, "The aviation dream"; also in Xiandai jianchuan (Modern Ships) as reported by Kyodo in English, 27 January 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 27 January 1995, pp. 24-25. For a critical assessment of PLA power projection weaknesses see Michael G. Gallagher, "China's illusory threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194.

35

. Zhen Hongfan and Yin Pinduan, "I love you, Nansha."

36

. Cao Baojian and Ding Feng, "Years of efforts by a South Sea fleet naval base result in integrating the procurement, supply and transportation of materials to Nansha into a system." Jiefangjun bao, 17 March 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 23 March 1995, pp. 33-34.

37

. Wang Xihe, "ASEAN countries strengthen their national defence," Jiefangjun bao, 26 June 1993, p. 2.

38

. Nayan Chanda, "Show of force," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 October 1994, p. 29.

39

. Asad Latif, "Handling of Spratlys dispute a test for ARF." The Straits Times, 21 April 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 25 April 1995, pp. 58-59.

40

. Lo Ping, "CPC military attacks Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Zhengming, No. 201 (1 July 1994), in FBIS-CHI, 26 July 1994, pp. 33-35.

41

. Chen Jie, "China's Spratly policy: with special reference to the Philippines and Malaysia," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10 (October 1994), pp. 893-903.

42

. The McNamara delegation learned this in May 1994, McNamara et al., Sino-American Military Relations, p. 16.

43

. Harlan W. Jencks, "The PRC's military and security policy in the post-Cold War era," Issues and Studies, Vol. 30, No. 11 (November 1994), p. 94; for the original thesis, see Scott Boorman, The Protracted Game: A Wei-ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

44

. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Vietnam (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

45

. For a full exposition of these claims with detailed maps see Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea.

46

. Whiting, Calculus, pp. 240-41.

47

. Interviews by American scholars in Beijing during July 1995 experienced unusually hard-line attacks on U.S. policy, as reported by John W. Lewis and David Shambaugh, The New York Times, 1 August 1995, p. 2; the author's interviews were similar.

48

. Xin Wei, "Another wrong 'card'," Beijing Review, 116 July 1995, p. 18.

49

. Chen Dawei, "To make amends for the damage done to its relations with China, the United States

must give up its Cold War mode of thinking," Beijing Zhongguo xinwen she, 23 June 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 29 June 1995, pp. 3; for similar language see Xinhua in English, 28 July 1995, citing Zhou Jie, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation, in FBIS-CHI, 28 July 1995, p. 5.

50

. Xinhua in English, 18 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 18 July 1995, p. 28; also Xinhua in English, 26 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 27 July 1995, p. 18.

51

. Ming bao, 27 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 27 July 1995, p. 18; also South China Morning Post, 7 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 7 July 1995, p. 26.

52

. Lianhe bao, 19 July 1995 and 20 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 20 July 1995, pp. 16-18; South China Morning Post, 7 July 1995 and 17 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 7 July 1995, 227 and 17 July 1995, pp. 43-44.

53

. Yi Fan, "Chinese Communists prepare public opinion for attacking Taiwan with force," Zhengming, No. 208 (1 February 1995), in FBIS-CHI, 14 April 1995, pp. 22-24. Papers included "Military means, choice to achieve cross-straits reunification." and "Military means, only way to resolve reunification issue."

54

. For a recapitulation of Hong Kong press reports alleging PLA protests on policy toward the U.S. see Whiting, "Chinese nationalism and foreign policy after Deng." Well-informed participants at the July 1995 conference on the PLA discounted these reports as not credible.

55

. For military aspects see Chong-pin Lin, "The military balance in the Taiwan Straits," An informed cautionary note warned, "in order to carry out a sea blockade one must first seize control of the air and be able to carry out a blockade of the airspace," Colonel Min Zengfu, assistant professor at the PRC Air Force Command College, "A glimpse at 21st century air combat." Zhongguo junshi kexue (China Military Science), 20 February 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 5 October 1995, pp. 17-24.

56

. McNamara et al., Sino-American Military Relations, pp. 221.

57

. Based on comparison of American interviews in 1994-95.

58

. Niu Jun, "Perspective of U.S. policy toward China," Guangming ribao, 14 September 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 26 September 1995, pp. 4-6 offered a nuanced differentiation of Congressional and Executive aspects.

59

. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 August 1995, pp. 20-21.

60

. Shambaugh, "The insecurity of security." His interviews have reconfirmed this on successive visits since the mid-1980s.

61

. This was confirmed by staff and faculty at the National Defence University to the McNamara delegation, Sino-American Relations, p. 16.

62

. Tsung Lan-hai, "CPC decides on its international archenemy." Zhengming, No. 195 (1 January 1994), in FBIS-CHI, 25 January 1994, pp. 4-6. Shambaugh, "The insecurity of security." reports, "this meeting, its conclusions, and the authenticity of the Zhengming report have been confirmed to me by participants."

63

. The reference is made by Shambaugh, "The insecurity of security." In July 1995 interviews with security analysts included the assertion, "if the U.S. sees China as its enemy, we will respond in kind."

64

. One military official told the McNamara delegation that in his dictionary "expansion" is a synonym of "enlargement," an avowed White House policy goal, suggesting the U.S. is expansionist.

65

. Memorandum, Office of Senior Specialists, Congressional Research Service, 15 August 1994.

66

. Robert G. Sutter and Shirley Kan, China as a Security Concern in Asia: Perceptions, Assessment, and U.S. Options (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 22 December 1994).

67

. Robert G. Sutter, China in World Affairs--U.S. Policy Choices (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 31 January 1995).

68

. See 1986 interviews in Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); for 1992, Bonnie S. Glaser, "China's security perceptions: interests and ambitions." Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3 (March 1993); for 1993, Shambaugh, "The insecurity of security"; for 1994, Thomas J. Christensen, "Structure, perceptions, and aspirations in Chinese security policy," unpublished manuscript.

69

. Shambaugh, "The insecurity of security."

70

. Zong Heshi, "International trends: review and forecast," Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 1 (20 January 1995), in FBIS-CHI, 14 July 1995, pp. 5-7.

71

. Wei Yang, "Keep watch on Japan's movement." Liaowang, No. 26 (26 June 1995), in FBIS-CHI, 18 July 1995, pp. 11-12. See also Wang Guotai, "'Resolution' that fails to distinguish right from wrong." Renmin ribao, 27 June 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 5 July 1995, pp. 16-17.

72

. Li Peng to Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, 3 May 1995, Xinhua Domestic Service, 3 May 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 4 May 1995, pp. 8-9.

73

. Xinhua in English, 4 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI. 5 July 1995, p. 17, summarizes "the first ... systematic collection of documentary materials" on Japanese atrocities, including "bombing of Tianjin and massacres in Baoding and Shijiazhuang" published in August 1995.

74

. Geng Dianzhong, "From Seattle to Jakarta," Shijie jingji yu hengshi, No. 2 (10 February 1995), in FBIS-CHI, 16 May 1995, pp. 7-11. The article was written in December 1994.

75

. Michael D. Swaine, "The modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: prospects and implications for Northeast Asia," NBR Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 3 (October 1994).

76

. For Japanese concern see Ikuo Kayahara, chief of Asian Region Research Office, National Institute for Defence Studies, "Thorough analysis of the Chinese military power," Chuo koron, February 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 1 February 1995, pp. 15-21.

77

. Lin Mu, "The aviation dream"; the same article appeared in Guardian, Kyodo in English, 26 July 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 27 July 1994, pp. 10-11.

78

. Kyodo in English, 11 April 1995, in FBIS-East Asia (EAS), 12 April 1995, pp. 9-10.

79

. Xiandai jianchuan cited by Kyodo in English, 2 June 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 2 June 1994, pp. 7.

80

. Tsung Lan-hai, "CPC decides on its international archenemy."

81

. Shu Xiangdi, "Russia's Asia policy," Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 12 (20 December 1994), in FBIS-CHI, 3 May 1995, pp. 4-7. For a provocative view, see Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: the genesis of an Eastern Rapallo." Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3 (March 1993), pp. 285-301.

82

. Harry Gelman, "Japan and China as seen from Moscow today," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 49-60; Charles E. Ziegler, "Russia in the Asia-Pacific: a major power or minor participant?" Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 6 (June 1994), pp. 529-543.

83

. Glaser "China's security perceptions," p. 256, n. 3. For the 1995 joint communique between Premier Li and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin addressing this issue see Xinhua Domestic Service, 27 June 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 29 June 1995, pp. 8-9.

84

. China Daily, 10 May 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 10 May 1995, p. 10.

85

. Editorial, "We should safeguard world peace and promote mutual development--greeting President Jiang Zemin's successful trip to Moscow," Renmin ribao, 10 May 1995, Xinhua Domestic Service, 9 May 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 10 May 1995, pp. 11-12.

86

. Remark by top Chinese PLA official to an American delegation.

87

. Wang Jinfeng, "World military situation in evolution," Jiefangjun bao, 4 January 1994, p. 4.

88

. J. Richard Walsh, "China and the new geopolitics of Central Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3 (March 1993), pp. 272-285.

89

. In the 1980s Beijing protested against creation of the Institute of Uighur Studies in Alma-Ata as "interference in Chinese affairs." The author's interview with institute official in 1990.

90

. Yitzhak Shichor, "Separatism: Sino-Muslim conflict in Xinjiang." Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1994).

91

. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-tsai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958).

92

. This paragraph draws on Shichor, "Separatism."

93

. Li Rongxia. "Tarim Basin: new hope for China's oil industry," Beijing Review, Vol. 38, No. 17 (24-30 April 1995), pp. 10-13.

94

. "Our important political task," Lhasa Tibet Television Network in Mandarin, 6 April 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 11 April 1995, pp. 75-76.

95

. J. Mohan Malik, "China-India relations in the post-Soviet era: the continuing rivalry," The China Quarterly, No. 142 (June 1995), pp. 317-355, esp. p. 328.

96

. Yan Xuetong, "Economic security, good-neighbour policy emphasized in post-Cold War security strategy." Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 8 (20 August 1995) in FBIS-CHI, 16 October 1995, pp. 8-14.

97

. Mao Zhenfa and Lin Zhipei, "The strategic status of modern border defence."

98

. "Ten years of combat readiness--a look at China-Burma border defence work," Renmin gongan bao, 3 February 1994, in JPRS-CAR 94-026, 27 April 1994, pp. 27-29.

99

. Zhou Defeng and Chen Weimin, "Seriously study how to win small wars," Jiefangjun bao, 1 January 1993, p. 3.

100

. In addition to the relevant papers in this volume, for analysis of the PLA in Chinese politics see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping: The Power Struggle Since Tiananmen (Hong Kong: PA Professional Consultants, 1995), ch. 4.

101

. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Vietnam (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.